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Some Notes on Comparing Tax Accounting
and General Accounting
by Arthur R. Cerio*
ANY PROBLEMS of taxation are caused by the differences be-
tween tax accounting principles and generally accepted ac-
counting principles.1 Despite years of extensive litigation, the
question of the timing of income or deductions is difficult to deter-
mine. 2 Usually no additional revenue is realized by these con-
flicts in principles; they merely cause a shift of revenue between
the years.3
Clarence F. Reimer presents three main categories which are
responsible for the differences: 4
"The first main cause is obvious. The Sixteenth Amend-
ment gives Congress the power to tax gross income. * * *
Congress can and has caused many of the present differences
in income for accounting and tax purposes by not taxing cer-
tain types of income, by disallowing certain types of expenses
as deductions, and by allowing deductions for non-expense
items * * *"
"The second main cause for differences is the interpreta-
tion given to tax statutes by the Treasury Department in its
Regulations, Treasury Decisions, and Opinions, and by the
courts in their decisions on tax problems. This category of
differences is composed primarily of differences in the year
of incidence of income or deduction * * *."
"A third cause of some of the current differences be-
tween net income for accounting and for Federal income tax
purposes is the necessity to avoid taxing of income earned or
accrued prior to March 1, 1913 * * *."
The "generally accepted accounting method" employed by the
taxpayer should solve the question of when an item is income or a
deduction. However, the solution to this question will depend
on the limitations of the statute, particularly in the case of de-
* Mr. Cerio, a third year student at Cleveland-Marshall, is employed as an
accountant with Arthur Andersen & Co.
1 Seghers, Tax Accounting Compared with Recognized Accounting Prin-
ciples, 27 Taxes 145 (Feb. 1949).
2 Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112 (1940).
3 Lasser, Tax Accounting Incongruities, 83 J. Accountancy 221 (March 1947).
4 Reimer, Differences in Net Income for Accounting and Federal Income
Taxes, Ch. III, pp. 25-28 (1949).
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ductions, and in the case of income, on the broad concepts evolved
in recent years by Bureau rulings and court decisions.5
The question of "when" is extremely important in the field of
accounting; yet, the income tax statutes are usually silent on this
point.6 In the absence of express provisions in the statutes, sec-
tions 41, 42, and 43 of the Internal Revenue Code should apply.
7
These sections seem clear and simple and their application equally
so. They indicate that if the procedure used by the taxpayer is
correct accounting practice, taxwise the taxpayer should properly
report as income the amount thus computed. However, the Com-
missioner and the courts have not been inclined to follow this
interpretation.
No uniform method of accounting can be used by all tax-
payers and this fact is accepted in "tax law." The regulations
contemplate that each taxpayer shall adopt such forms and
systems of accounting as are in his judgment best suited to his
5 2 Merten, Law of Federal Income Taxation, Sect. 12.01.
6 Exceptions are Code Sections 23(p) and 24(c). The first section deals
with contributions of an employer to an employees' trust or annuity plan
and compensation under a deferred-payment plan. The latter deals with
unpaid expenses and interest.
7 Internal Revenue Code, as amended to January 7, 1952.
Part IV-Accounting Periods and Methods of Accounting.
"Section 41-General Rule.
The net income shall be computed upon the basis of the taxpayer's
annual accounting period (fiscal year or calendar year, as the case may be)
in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed in keep-
ing the books of such taxpayer; but if no such method of accounting has been
so employed, or if the method employed does not clearly reflect the income,
the computation shall be made in accordance with such method as in the
opinion of the Commissioner does clearly reflect the income. If the tax-
payer's annual accounting period is other than a fiscal year as defined in
section 48 or if the taxpayer has no annual accounting period or does not
keep books, the net income shall be computed on the basis of the calendar
year. * * *"
"Section 42-Period in Which Items of Gross Income Included.
(a) General Rule-The amount of all items of gross income shall be
included in the gross income for the taxable year in which received by the
taxpayer, unless, under methods of accounting permitted under section 41,
any such amounts are to be properly accounted for as of a different period.
* * *"1
"Section 43-Period for Which Deductions and Credits Taken.
The deductions and credits (other than the corporation dividend paid
credit provided in section 27) provided for in this chapter shall be taken for
the taxable year in which 'paid or accrued' or 'paid or incurred,' dependent
upon the method of accounting upon the basis of which the net income is
computed, unless in order to clearly reflect the income the deductions or
credits should be taken as of a different period. * * *"
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purpose.8 The two principalmethods of accounting recognized for
tax purposes are (1) the cash receipts and disbursements basis,
generally called the cash basis, and (2) the accrual basis. In some
instances a hybrid method of accounting has also been recognized.
Generally speaking, the cash method computes income by de-
ducting actual cash expenditures for the accounting period from
actual cash receipts,9 while the accrual method allocates receipts
and disbursements to the accounting period in which earned or
consumed, regardless of the time of receipt or payment.
The Internal Revenue Code sections 41, 42, and 43 form the
foundation of sound tax accounting. In reading these sections, the
inexperienced taxpayer or tax practitioner may think that tax
law, complicated as it may appear, is in harmony with any sound
system of accounting being used by the taxpayer.10 However, it is
submitted these sound statutory provisions are often the subject
of misconstruction by the Internal Revenue Bureau and the
courts, although some relatively recent decisions give us hope
for better recognition of "any sound system." The cases of Towers
Warehouses, Inc. vs. Commissioner1" and Millar Brainard et al.
vs. Commissioner12 may be used as examples.
In the first case, the taxpayer was engaged in a storage busi-
ness and charged shippers in advance for handling costs both in
and out of its warehouse. In accordance with a long established
practice, it excluded from income each year a portion of the
handling charge which it estimated represented the actual cost of
out-handling of shipments remaining in storage at the end of the
year.
In most prior instances, the Commissioner and the courts
had not been so willing to defer the taxation of dollar receipts.
If for such dollar receipts a service had to be rendered in the
future, the dollars in whole or part returned, or an expenditure
incurred, the deduction could only be taken at the time of the
s U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, Sect. 29.41-3 (1943).
9 See U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, Sect. 29.42-2 (1943). An exception to this rule
occurs where the taxpayer may be taxable prior to the time of actual re-
ceipt in accordance with the theory of constructive receipt.
10 Supra note 3.
11 CCH 6 T. C. M. 59 (1947), Dec. 15,587(M).
12 7 T. C. 1180 (1946).
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outgo of money or the accrual of an actual liability.13 Under
recognized accounting practices, the Commissioner's position
would not fairly reflect actual income. The Bureau, under these
circumstances, would succeed in taxing income received but not
earned.
The Court's decision in this case supported the doctrine of
recognition of a system of accounts shown to have been of many
years standing and consistently followed. This decision also evi-
dences a trend in the tax field leading to a closer determination
of income as followed in the commercial and business fields.
In the Towers case, the court observed:
"* * * The addition to reserve by Warehouses [the peti-
tioner] was disallowed by respondent on the ground that the
liability had not yet been incurred by the Warehouses. It is
evident that respondent had in mind Warehouses' liability to
its laborers who had not yet performed the services for which
Warehouses had been paid. He overlooks the fact that Ware-
houses had incurred a very definite and fixed liability to its
customers to perform, at no additional cost to them, this
service no matter what it should cost and had been paid in full
by its customers for such services.
It should be kept in mind that we do not have here a
contingent liability which, of course, would not be subject to
accrual. This liability was fixed. The fact that the exact
amount which it was later necessary to pay could not be
determined does not preclude the accrual of the liability in
an amount estimated with reasonable accuracy * * * "
The court recognized the error in forcing the inclusion in income
of gross collections without fair provision for cost of fulfillment or
performance.
This treatment brings to mind that approved by the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue in I. T. 336914 in which lump sum
payments for multiple period subscriptions were permitted to be
taken into income ratably over the fulfillment periods. It should
be pointed out, however, that this I. T. is applicable to only the
specialized industry of publishing. In I. T. 3369 the gross receipts
and hence the profits were reported as income in the period
earned. Under the Towers decision the profits were all reported
in the period of receipt and only the cost for the performance of
the contract was deferred.
13 E.g., Brown vs. Helvering, 291 U. S. 193 (1934) (overriding commissions
on one, three and five year fire insurance policy); Your Health Club, Inc.,
4 T. C. 385 (1944) (contract for personal services extending beyond the
taxable year); South Tacoma Motor Co., 3 T. C. 411 (1944) (coupon books
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The theory of I. T. 3369 would seem to reflect accepted ac-
counting concepts of allocating to each period all of the relative
income and cost factors and thus present a true picture of the
operations of that period. The Commissioner's stand in the Towers
case clearly distorts the taxable incomes of both periods. Re-
versing the Commissioner in this case, the court attempted to
compromise between two of the Commissioner's theories-the
immediate taxation of dollar receipts and that of allocating to
each period the income earned. The revenue is secured by taxing
the entire profit in the period in which the gross income is re-
ceived and the administrative dislike for deferment of income for
tax purposes is met. The distortion caused by the treatment of
gross receipts of one period and cost of goods sold as a deduction
of the following period is avoided.
In the Millar Brainard case, the taxpayer, who had been a
large scale stock-trader, ended up after the 1929 crash with in-
debtedness of over a million dollars and practically no property.
He entered into an agreement with his creditors to pay 4% in-
terest on the indebtedness and pledged what little property he
had as collateral to secure the performance of his undertaking to
pay the interest and principal on the debt. The taxpayer care-
fully, and under direction, kept his books of account and filed his
returns on an accrual basis. In each year he deducted the interest
accruing for that year; however, he did not pay the interest and
paid no Federal taxes since his other income was more than offset
by the annual interest accrual. In 1941 the Commissioner di-
rected a change over to a cash basis which, of course, he refused
to do.
The issue before the Tax Court was whether the Commis-
sioner had the authority to change the taxpayer from an accrual
to a cash basis. 15 The Tax Court refused to rule on this issue
entitling the purchaser to services to be performed after the year of sale);
Edward A. Renwick et al. Trustees vs. U. S., 87 F. 2d 123 (1937) (advance
rentals on ninety-nine year lease); Pioneer Automobile Service Co., 36
BTA 213 (1937) (fees paid for services to be rendered during lives of auto-
mobile owners for which reserves were set apart on the books); Automobile
Underwriters, Inc. 19 BTA 1160 (1930) (receipt of membership fees for
services to be rendered over a three year period).
14 1940 INT. REv. BuLL. 46.
15 "While the statute leaves much to the discretion of the Commissioner, he
is not entirely free to act capriciously or arbitrarily, and he may not, in de-
ciding what clearly reflects the income, sacrifice the facts to theory or fic-
tion." See Hyams Coal Co. vs. U. S., 26 F. 2d 805, 809 (1928); Reynolds
Cattle Co., 31 BTA 206, 209, 211 (1934). The Supreme Court has suggested
that the Commissioner is "vested with wide discretion," in deciding whether
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made by the parties, but sustained the deficiency on the ground
that the interest was not deductible since "there was no reason-
able prospect of payment." In other words, tax-wise it was im-
proper to accrue definite, fixed and legally binding lik-.bilities for
the payment of interest unless there is a reasonable prospect that
payment will be made. Accounting-wise, however, and under the
accepted accrual method of accounting, this liability would be
proper irrespective of the prospect of payment.
The Commissioner discussed, in I. T. 3635,16 the deductibility
of interest on the old debt structures of railroads in reorganization
where plans provided for a new debt structure of lesser amount
and lower interest cost. It was clear that there was "no reason-
able prospect of payment" of the larger interest accrual on the
old debt structure. However, the Commissioner stated the full
amount of interest accrued was deductible from gross income for
the respective years of accrual and the doubt as to collectibility of
such interest is not such a contingency as postpones the accrual
of the liability until the contingency is resolved.
It is not so much the narrow field of interest accrual deduc-
tions which is affected by this theory; it is a distortion of a basic
accounting concept. The Tax Court refused to consider the real
issue but instead applied a new income test to determine the cash
or accrual basis. What the court did was to accept a general
accrual system but, thereafter, subjected a single item or trans-
action to a new test. Where the liability is definite in amount and
admitted to be due and has come into full maturity, all of the
heretofore stated definitions of accrual are met.17 In this case, the
Tax Court applied a further test, namely, "is there reasonable
prospect of payment." Failing this, the single item or transaction
out of this general accrual system goes over to a cash basis system.
This results in a hybrid system and a mixed cash and accrual
reporting which has been specifically rejected in other cases.'8
to permit a change of accounting method and has said that "it is not the
province of the court to weigh and determine the relative merits of systems
of accounting." See Brown vs. Helvering, supra note 13. See also Code
Section 41, supra note 7.
16 1944 INT. REV. BULL. 101.
17 Cf, e.g., Security Flour Mills Co. vs. Comm'r., 321 U. S. 281 (1943); Burnet
vs. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U. S. 359 (1931); Dixie Pine Products Co. vs.
Comm'r., 320 U. S. 516 (1944); The Baltimore Transfer Co. of Baltimore City
vs. Comm'r., 8 T. C. 1 (1947).
18 Cf. e.g., Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. vs. U. S., 288 U. S. 269
(1933); Hygienic Products Co. vs. Comm'r., 37 BTA 202 (1938); aff'd., 111 F.
2d 330 (1940), cert. denied, 311 U. S. 665 (1940).
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The resultant basis of tax reporting is neither cash nor ac-
crual, is at variance with the method employed by the taxpayer
in maintaining his books and records, and is apparently contrary
to the Coi imissioner's construction of Section 41 and other ap-
plicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
The government, of course, has no monopoly on the confusion
which exists between general accounting and tax accounting.
Some years ago, several small law and accounting firms con-
ceived the idea that any corporation which was subject to renego-
tiation of war contracts should not be considered to have accrued
taxable income on account of such contracts until the renegotia-
tion proceedings had been terminated. For example, if a corpora-
tion were subject to renegotiation for any of the years 1940 to
1945 (being excess profits tax years) these accountants or attor-
neys took the position that no taxable income accrued with re-
spect to the renegotiable portion of the business until 1946 or
thereafter (when excess profits taxes were no longer in effect)
upon final settlement with the renegotiation authorities. They
recommended the filing of claims for refund on such basis and
solicited the work on a contingent basis, usually one-third of the
savings with a certain minimum fee.
A number of suits were brought in the United States Court
of Claims involving this principle. The Court of Claims in the
Holmes Projector Company case19 in rendering a decision for the
government and against the taxpayer held that the income is tax-
able on the accrual basis in the year earned despite the fact that
the company might be subject to renegotiation in later years. The
court in this current case followed "good accounting."
The taxpayer and his advisors in this case were clearly at-
tempting to violate one of the basic principles of accounting.20 If
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the courts are ex-
pected to adhere closely to generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples, the taxpayers and tax practitioners must likewise follow
the same principles.2 1
19 2 CCH 1952 Fed. Tax Ref. P. 9404 (U. S. Ct. Cl. 1952).
20 Finney, "Principles of Accounting-Intermediate," 3rd Edition, pages 196-
197 (Revenues should not be regarded as earned until an asset increment
has been realized, or until its realization is reasonably assured).
21 Sydney A. Gutkin and David Beck in their article "Tax Accounting v.
Business Accounting-The Emasculation of Section 41" make these com-
ments:
"The average person has not been reared in an environment conducive
to accounting consciousness. Included in this group is the lawyer. He has
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1953
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been trained to cope with legal concepts and has, in this connection, been
taught to present facts in such a manner that legal conclusions most favorable
to him will be delivered therefrom. Understandably, no attention has been
directed by him to the finer points of accounting concepts involving cash re-
ceipts and disbursements, accruals, methods of reporting income, reserves
created to reflect liabilities, and the like. * * *"
"* * * the legal profession has been, and still is, responsible for the
introduction, presentation, and perpetuation of confusion and error in cases
involving the interpretation of accounting principles. * * *"
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol2/iss2/8
